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Abstract—After more than a decade of research and stan-
dardization, Mobile Ad Hoc NETworks (MANET) are finding
their place in real-world deployments, such as in community,
tactical and vehicular networks. Becoming so present in “the real
world” also means that MANETs, and the protocols operating
them, are affronted with a more hostile environment, where
misconfiguration, eavesdropping, and attacks must be addressed.
A first step in addressing MANET security is understanding the
vulnerabilities of MANET protocols, and how an attacker can
exploit these.
This paper studies the Relay Set Selection (RSS) algorithms
that are commonly used in multicast routing protocol for
MANETs, and which are undergoing standardization as part of
the Simplified Multicast Forwarding (SMF) protocol, developed
within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Attack
vectors for these different RSS algorithms are described, with
the purpose of enabling future development of security solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network security is as old as networking, and as vast as au-
thentication, non-repudiation, integrity, etc. In traditional wired
networks, security is largely based on maintaining physical
control of access to the communication channel (fiber, coaxial
cable, etc.). In a wireless MANET environment, routers and
hosts are more vulnerable to different threats since:
• Physical access to the wireless medium is not delimited
by wired cables, but available to anyone within transmis-
sion range. Furthermore, compared to a wired media, a
wireless medium is more unreliable and unpredictable,
rendering behavioral observation more difficult;
• Resources in mobile devices are often constrained, both
in terms of CPU power, memory space, battery life, etc.
Such limited resource render the network more vulnerable
to attacks, especially Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack by
maliciously consuming the transmission channel, CPU
time, or resulting in memory overflow;
• The topology of a MANET is dynamic due to both
mobility of routers and variations in the wireless channel.
This implies that the use of traditional mechanisms such
as checkpoints, firewalls on ingress filtering based on a-
priory knowledge is less obvious.
Given the above, if for MANETs to stand a chance outside
the protected confines of research laboratories, security issues
have to be addressed. MANET deployments must consider
that misconfiguration and malicious routers are present, and
that neither physical media control nor a-priori topology
knowledge are viable security approaches.
A. Background and History
The “Simple Multicast Forwarding” (SMF) protocol [1] is
a multicast routing protocol for MANET-wide efficient broad-
casting. The protocol employs reduced relay sets for reducing
the number of redundant retransmissions of a data packet in the
network. Reduced relay sets so used were introduced in and
standardized for IP networks by way of the Optimized Link
State Routing Protocol (OLSR [2]) in 2003, where they were
used for substantially reducing the protocol overhead incurred
by diffusion of link state advertisements, in [2] denoted “TC
messages”. The reduced relay set mechanism in OLSR is
based on Multi-Point Relays (MPRs) [3]. This concept was
retained and used in an extension of OSPF for MANET areas
[4]. Other experimental routing protocols, including [5] and
[6], have used different reduced relay set mechanisms, and
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is standardizing
the next-generation MANET routing protocol OLSRv2 [7], re-
taining the MPR concept. The experimental reactive MANET
routing protocol AODV [8] also uses MANET-wide broadcast
of its route requests – for which [9] showed that using MPRs
for flooding route requests resulted not just in reduced channel
load, but also in shorter unicast paths.
The success of reduced relay sets for diffusion of routing
protocol control traffic lead to work on using the same
mechanisms also for user data traffic, including [10] and [11],
ultimately leading to the IETF development of SMF [1], as
an experimental protocol. SMF provides basic IP multicast
routing for MANETs. It consists of two main components:
multicast “Duplicate Packet Detection” (DPD) and “Relay Set
Selection” (RSS).
• DPD is used in the forwarding process to identify if
an incoming packet has been previously received (and
forwarded) – and thus should be dropped – or not. DPD
is achieved by a router maintaining a record of recently
processed multicast packets, and comparing received mul-
ticast packets herewith. A duplicate packet detected is
silently dropped, and not inserted into the forwarding path
of that router – nor delivered to an application.
• RSS yields a reduced relay set for relaying data packets
across a MANET. SMF supports several RSS algorithms:
E-CDS (Essential Connected Dominating Set), S-MPR
(Source-based Multi-Point Relay), and MPR-CDS, based
on localized election and derived from those explored for
topology diffusion in MANET routing protocols.
B. Statement of Purpose
RSS algorithms for efficient flooding have been well studied
for performance and convergence properties. However it is
generally assumes that all routers in the networks can be
trusted to perform their part in the RSS algorithm properly.
In the “Real World”, where a wireless channel is accessible
to anyone within radio-range, this can not be assumed be that
due to router misconfiguration or malice.
This paper analyses the vulnerabilities of the different RSS
algorithms, proposed by SMF [1]. It is worth noting that SMF,
as an experimental protocol, does not prescribe a preferred
RSS algorithm, but rather serves to document the different
options and encourage experiments and evaluation in order to
determine – by way of testing against “the real world” – which
eventually becomes preferred. Part of this “testing against the
real world” – and the ambition of this paper – is testing how
an RSS algorithm stands up against different security threats.
While the paper has the ambition of being through, in
matters of security it is prudent to be explicit to not claim
completeness of analysis.
C. Paper Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section
II, describes general threats, commonly applicable to all RSS
algorithms; section III, section IV and section V, then specifi-
cally studies vulnerabilities to E-CDS, S-MPR and MPR-CDS,
respectively. This paper is concluded in section VI.
II. GENERAL THREATS TO RELAY SET SELECTION
A. Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is a common and easy passive attack in
a wireless environment. Once a packet is transmitted, any
close receiver can obtain a copy without being detected,
for immediate or later decoding. SMF uses a neighborhood
discovery protocol, NHDP [12] for providing each router
with 1-hop and 2-hop topological information, permitting RSS
algorithms to operate. A malicious router can eavesdrop on the
NHDP message exchange and thus learn this local topology
information, as well as some source and destination addresses
of data packets transmitted. Eavesdropping is not direct threat
to the network integrity, nor to SMF, but it can provide
crucial network information such as identity of communicating
routers, link characteristic, router configuration, etc., enabling
other attacks.
B. Message Timing Attack
As NHDP is used to provide local topology information for
RSS algorithms, NHDP vulnerabilities thus affect SMF. NHDP
HELLO messages define two types of timing information:
• Validity time, the time during which the information
conveyed by the message should be considered valid.
• Interval time, the time after which the next control
message from the same router should be expected.
For validity time, an attacker can simply eavesdrop on
HELLOs, then instantly upon receipt replay the HELLO – but
modified to have a low validity time, illustrated in figure 1.
Router b broadcasts a HELLO with valiT ime = 6s. Router a
receives the HELLO and marks the link between itself and b
is valid for 6 seconds. X eavesdrops on the messages, obtains
the identity of router b, then transmits the HELLO with
valiTime=0.1s. Receipt of this message by a causes a to
replace previously received link information, and therefore
consider the link between itself and b as invalid after very
short time (0.1 second). For SMF, this means that b will not
be selected as relay by a even it may provide good connectivity
to other parts of the network.
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Figure 1. Validity time attack: The malicious router, X, spoofs b and declares
a short validity time of the link.
A similar attack exists for interval time: a malicious router
behaves as above, and also indicate a low interval time. A
recipient of a HELLO with interval time so modified will
expect a subsequent HELLO within this very short time –
which will not arrive: the recipient decreases the link quality,
or may discard this link. Further vulnerabilities to the NHDP
exist [13].
C. Indirect Jamming
For NHDP, a malicious router can – intentionally and
frequently – alter the neighborhood information, link state,
etc. declared in HELLOs, and thereby cause generation of
inordinate amounts of control traffic by legitimate routers and
increase the resources required for message processing [13].
Used by all RSS algorithms, indirect jamming of NHDP is
a threat to every SMF router: a malicious router can generate
plausible control traffic to in turn trigger receiving routers to
generate additional traffic, e.g.,a malicious router can keep
changing its router priority to provoke recalculation of and
signaling of relay sets.
D. RSSV Attack
SMF uses distributed RSS algorithms that dynamically
calculate a topological Connected Dominating Set (CDS), gen-
erally assuming 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood information
as provided by NHDP. SMF supports different, and non-
interoperable, RSS algorithms – and, hence, SMF routers
convey to their neighbors which algorithm(s) they respectively
support. To this end, [1] defines a “Relay Set Selection Vector”
(RSSV), by way of message and address block TLVs [14],
to be included in the NHDP HELLOs such that an SMF
router can declare which RSS algorithms it, and its immediate
neighbors, support1. An SMF outer must therefore select relay
sets according to compatibility of the algorithms operating in
SMF routers in its 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhoods. A potential
attack is, therefore, if a router – intentionally or otherwise –
share false RSSV information for itself or for its neighbors.
For example, in figure 2, router a is about to select its relays.
The following RSS algorithms are used in different routers:
• E-CDS: router b, d, e
• S-MPR: router c, f, g
• MPR-CDS: router h
All routers, faithfully, declare their RSSV. Based on the
messages from routers b, h and c, router a learns what
algorithms are supported by both its direct neighbors and its
2-hop neighbors. This allows router a to observe that while
router h provides topological coverage to all of the 2-hop
routers (d, e, f, g), router h runs an RSS algorithm different
from all of d, e, f, g. Therefore, if a selects h as relay, h may
not be able to select relays among d, e, f, g and thus packet
forwarding beyond d, e, f, g would not happen. Router a also
learns that router b runs the same RSS algorithm as the 2-
hop neighbors d, e, reachable via b – and that router c runs
the same RSS algorithm as the 2-hop neighbors f, g, reachable
via c. Router a can therefore select b and c as relays, knowing
that both of these will be able to not only provide coverage
to all 2-hop neighbors, but also be able to select proper relays
among these 2-hop neighbors.
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Figure 2. Relay set selection considering RSSV: Router a makes the decision
based on the RSSV declared by TLVs.
A malicious router, spoofing the RSSV of its 2-hop neigh-
bors, is shown in figure 3: X declares itself with RSSV=MPR-
CDS, and further declares that d, e, f, g have RSSV=MPR-CDS.
Thus, router a choses X as sole relay: from the information
available to a, X provides optimal topological coverage of
1While several RSS are supported in the same network, it is not clearly
specified in the current revision of SMF [1] whether a router can concurrently
support several different RSS at the same time.
the 2-hop neighborhood – and by running the same RSS as
(declared for) all 2-hop neighbors, should be able to also do
proper relay set selection with these. As a consequence, X
will “take control” of the multicast traffic in its neighborhood
– in this case, be able to prohibit b and c from being selected
as relays and, thus, if X isnot actually forwarding traffic or
performing RSS, disrupt network connectivity.
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Figure 3. Attack on the RSSV to disrupt the relay set selection: The malicious
router X spoofs the RSSV of d, e, f, g.
Furthermore, the indirect jamming attack mentioned in the
previous subsection is also applicable to RSSV signaling by
changing the RSSV type continuously.
III. E-CDS VULNERABILITIES
The Essential Connected Dominating Set (E-CDS) RSS
algorithm produces a common set of relays for all routers in
the network. Routers self-select as relays based on priority in-
formation and of the 1-hop and 2-hop neighborhood topology.
The priority of a router can be e.g.,, a router metrics (such as
power level) or simply a tie-breaker such as the router address.
Using E-CDS, a router self-select as relay if and only if:
• the router’s router priority is greater than the priority of
all its two-hop neighbors, OR
• there is no path from the highest priority neighbor to all
other one and two hop neighbors using only routers with
greater priority as relays.
A malicious router can disrupt E-CDS selection, by way of
link spoofing and identity spoofing, discussed separately.
A. Link Spoofing
Link spoofing implies that a router advertises non-existing
links to another router (present in the network or not). Based
on NHDP, a malicious router can perform link spoofing by
modifying HELLOs.
In figure 4, where solid lines illustrate actual links whereas
dotted lines “spoofed” links, router a tries to make E-CDS
relay set selection based on the one-hop and two-hop neighbor-
hood information from router b, c, d and e (The router priority
is as indicated in figure 4). If the algorithm runs properly, a
will choose itself as a relay, because it has the highest priority
among its two-hop neighbors. Alas, present is also a malicious
router, X, which (i) declares itself with the highest priority in
the neighborhood (RtrPri = 6), and (ii) advertises links (real
or spoofed) to all of a’s one-hop and two-hop neighbors. By
thus presenting itself as a router with high priority and strong
connection with other routers, a will not be able to select itself
as relay: X appears as providing better coverage and higher
priority.
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Figure 4. E-CDS algorithm disruption by link spoofing. Router a is trying
to make relay set selection and malicious router X declares itself with high
router priority and spoofs the link to the neighbors of a.
The effect of link spoofing depends on the local topology
and the ability to eavesdrop: the biggest impact can be
achieved when information describing all the 2-hop links of
router a is available to X. If some of the 2-hop neighbors of a
are 3-hop away from the malicious attacker X, shown in figure
5, X can not obtain the identity of router c directly through
NHDP – limiting the effect of such an attack.
abc x
Figure 5. Limitation of link spoofing: malicious router X can not obtain the
identity of router c directly through NHDP.
Thus, malicious routers disrupt the network by preventing
legit routers from self-selecting as relays. Link-spoofing can
also cause routers to (unnecessarily) self-select relays, with the
goal of degrading the flooding operation to classic flooding.
This is illustrated in figure 6, where solid lines illustrate actual
links whereas dotted lines “spoofed” links: router a with low
priority (RtrPri = 2) will not self-select since b both has
the highest priority (RtrPri = 5)in the 2-hop neighborhood,
and can provide links to all other neighbors of a by way
of relays with higher priority than a. Alas, present is also
a malicious router X which (i) declares itself with the lowest
priority (RtrPri = 1), and (ii) spoofs a link to (fictive or
present) router z. As a consequence, a has to self-select as
relay no route to z, using only routers withs greater priority
than a, exists. This will be the case for all the neighbors of
X, therefore the E-CDS is by way of this link spoofing attack
degraded locally to classical flooding locally (discussed further
in section V-A).
B. Identity spoofing
Identity spoofing implies that a malicious router determines
and makes use of the identity of other routers, without
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Figure 6. E-CDS link spoofing attack. Malicious routerX mades router a have
to choose itself as relay, which degrades the relay set selection to classical
flooding.
being authorized to do so. A malicious router can obtain
the identity of a legitimate routers by overhearing HELLOs,
or source/destination addresses from the data traffic. The
malicious router can, then, generates (routing or data) traffic,
pretending to be the legitimate router.
As shown in figure 7, at time t0, router b sends a HELLO ,
declaring its priority RtrPri = 1. Router a hears the HELLO
and updates its information bases accordingly. The malicious
router X also receives the same HELLO, records the address
of b, and the sequence number of the HELLO, and then
transmits a HELLO immediately at time t1 (e.g.,100 ms after
t0), with the address of router b, with a higher sequence
number (so as to make the message appear legitimate) and
with a modified router priority (RtrPri = 6). On receiving
this second HELLO, router a will see it as simply reporting
updated information from a. As HELLO are sent periodically,
X can time its transmissions such that a will operate with
incorrect information for b. In this particular case, it will
prevent a from self-selecting as relay.
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Figure 7. E-CDS identity spoofing attack. Malicious router X overhears the
identity of b at t0 and sends out a poisoned HELLLO message as b at t1.
IV. S-MPR VULNERABILITIES
The Source-based Multipoint Relay (S-MPR) RSS algo-
rithm is derived from [2] and [7], and enables routers to select
a reduced relay set (called the routers MPR set) from among
their one-hop neighbors such that a message generated by a
router and relayed by its MPR Set will be received by all
routers 2-hops away. Once a router has selected its MPR set,
it signals this (embedded in a HELLO) to the neighbors it
has selected as MPR. An S-MPR router forwards a multicast
packet if and only if:
• the packet is never before received, AND
• the packet was received from a neighbor with which it
has a bi-directional link, AND
• and the neighbor from which the packet was received has
selected the router as an relay.
As with E-CDS, a malicious router can, by spoofing the
link or the identity of specified routers, disrupt the proper
functioning of the S-MPR RSS.
A. Link Spoofing
Routers that run S-MPR select relays from among their
one-hop neighbors. To reduce redundant data transmissions,
the routers with better connectivity are given priority when
considered as relays. Thus, a malicious router can spoof the
links to other routers to prevent that other, legitimate, routers
be selected. This is illustrated in figure 8, where solid lines
illustrate actual links whereas dotted lines “spoofed” links.
Router a is selecting its relays from among X and b. If both
X and b faithfully declare their neighborhoods, b has to be
chosen so as to make sure that a message generated by a and
relayed by the selected MPRs reach all routers 2-hops away
from a (i.e.,d, e). Alas, X is malicious and spoofs links to
d and e – in addition to a link to the fictitious router, c. As
a consequence, when a is running S-MPR algorithm, it only
choses X as its MPR as it believes that X can provide links
to all the two-hop neighbors of b, in addition to the fictitious
c. If X then ultimately does not relay multicast traffic d and e
are rendered unreachable.
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Figure 8. S-MPR link spoofing attack. Malicious router X spoofs links to c,
d and e, to mask b from being chosen as relay by a.
B. Identity Spoofing
By overhearing HELLOs, the identity of other routers in the
network may be available for a malicious router. In NHDP,
HELLO messages are additive, thus a malicious router can
inject vicious incorrect additional information by spoofing the
identity of a detected legitimate router. This is illustrated in
figure 9, where solid lines illustrate actual links whereas dotted
lines “spoofed” links, and where router a is selecting relays
from among its one-hop neighbors. Absent any malicious
routers, b will be chosen as relay by a’s. Alas, present is also
a malicious router X, which (i) spoofs the identity of router
c, and (ii) declares links to d and (a fictitious or present)
f. Consequently, a selects only c as its relay, rendering d
ultimately unreachable for multicast traffic from a.
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Figure 9. S-MPR identity spoofing attack. Router a is running S-MPR
algorithm and malicious router X spoofs the identity of router c.
V. MPR-CDS VULNERABILITIES
MPR-CDS [15] is a derivative from S-MPR which – as E-
CDS – results in a common set of relays for all routers in the
network. In MPR-CDS, the MPR selection and signaling from
S-MPR is performed, but the forwarding rules are different,
specifically forwarding does not depend on from which router
a packet is received. An MPR-CDS router forwards a multicast
packet if and only if:
• the packet is never before received, AND
– the router’s priority is higher than the priority of all
its 1-hop neighborhood, OR
– the router has been selected as an relay by the
router that has the highest priority in its 1-hop
neighborhood.
It is worth noting that the main difference between S-MPR
and MPR-CDS is, that while MPR-CDS forms an unique
broadcast tree for all sources in the network, S-MPR forms
a different broadcast tree for each source in the network.
Nevertheless, as MPR-CDS combines E-CDS and S-MPR,
the vulnerabilities of E-CDS and S-MPR, discussed in section
III and section IV also apply to MPR-CDS. One additional
vulnerability is introduced, though: a simple way of degrading
the network into classic flooding.
A. Broadcast Storm
In wireless MANETs, a broadcast storm due to classic
flooding causes serious performance degradation: two or more
adjacent routers receiving a multicast packet at the same time
are likely to also re-transmit at the same time - causing their
transmissions to overlap, with as result channel contention and
collisions [16]. Avoiding broadcast storms is one of the reasons
why RSS algorithms are used – in SMF as well as in routing
protocols such as [2].
MPR-CDS is vulnerable to being degraded into classical
flooding, simply by way of a malicious router (i) declaring
itself to have the the highest priority in its neighborhood,
and (ii) selecting all its neighbors as MPR, shown in figure
10. Note that this attack works due to the “common set of
relays for all routers in the network” philosophy. S-MPR is
not vulnerable to this particular attack since the relays selected
by the malicious router X are used only by traffic transiting X
itself.
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Figure 10. MPR-CDS
Figure 11 illustrated broadcast storm (dotted lines, classic
flooding), compared to MPR-CDS (and S-MPR) intentional
traffic (solid lines).
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Figure 11. The broadcast storm attack: The bold line with arrow represents
normal multicast traffic, and the dashed line the redundant traffic caused by
having all the 1-hop neighbors of a be selected as relays.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has described a set of vulnerabilities of relay
set selection algorithms as specified by the “Simple Multicast
Forwarding” (SMF) protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.
SMF provides a framework, supporting different RSS algo-
rithms and, based on the neighborhood discovery protocols
(NHDP) a set of RSS: E-CDS, S-MPR and MPR-CDS.
In addition to vulnerabilities inherited from the feature of
wireless medium and its use of NHDP, SMF introduces vul-
nerabilities by way of those RSS algorithms. Mis-configured
routers or malicious attackers can inject inconsistent topology
information in the network by link spoofing or identity spoof-
ing, thus result in network disruption or even degrading RSS
algorithms to classical flooding. Furthermore, because SMF
provides a signaling mechanism (RSSV) to identify various
RSS algorithms, the malicious routers have the chance to
present conflicting information to disturb the decision of relay
set selection.
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